Dependability Evaluation and Supervision in Thermal Power Plants by Ben Hamouda, Marwa et al.
International Journal of Electrical and Computer Engineering (IJECE) 
Vol. 5, No. 5, October 2015, pp. 905~917 
ISSN: 2088-8708      905 
  
Journal homepage: http://iaesjournal.com/online/index.php/IJECE 
Dependability Evaluation and Supervision in Thermal Power 
Plants  
 
 
Marwa Ben Hammouda, Mohamed Najeh Lakhoua, Lilia El Amraoui 
U.R: Mechatronic Systems and Signals, ENI Carthage, University of Carthage, Tunisia 
 
 
Article Info  ABSTRACT
Article history: 
Received Apr 7, 2015 
Revised May 18, 2015 
Accepted Jun 2, 2015 
 
 In order to improve the productivity and the consistency of its maintenance 
strategies, the industrial world is based on different techniques and tools 
developed to ensure safe operation and the supervision of production 
systems. In fact, dependability evaluation is crucial to controlling the risks 
associated with system failure, and for this reason, it is one of the 
fundamental steps in automated system design. In this paper, we present 
firstly the basic concepts for the study of dependability as well as functional 
systems analysis. Thus, we present the method SADT (Structured Analysis 
Design technique). Given the ineffectiveness of methods that are currently 
exploited are not appropriate because the level of complexity of such 
industrial systems, we propose in the first the Safe-SADT method which 
allows the explicit formalization of functional interaction, the identification 
of the characteristic values affecting complex system dependability, the 
quantification of RAMS parameters (Reliability, Availability, 
Maintainability, and Safety) for the system’s operational architecture. 
Secondly, a methodology for designing supervisory production systems has 
been presented and has been applied on an example of a SCADA 
(supervisory control and data acquisition) system of a thermal power plant. 
Finally, a model of operating safety and supervision of a production system 
is proposed.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Today, the dependability of production systems is more and more complex to perform, not only 
because of the number of variables always more numerous to monitor but also because of the numerous 
interrelations existing between them, very difficult to interpret when the process is highly automated. Indeed, 
dependability characterizes the performance of a system in that reflects its ability to achieve its mission. It is 
connected to its capacity to resist the material, software and human failures, and the attacks of its 
environment [1]. 
The concepts of supervision are also essential. Infact, the supervision can detect anomalies without 
necessarily act directly on the system in order to optimize its operation and to ensure the safety [2].  
In this paper, we present in a first part the main definitions and concepts of dependability. In the 
second part, we present the architecture and the characteristics of supervision. In the third part, we present the 
methods and tools ensuring the dependability analysis for products systems under design or redesign. Finally, 
we present a general model in order to study the dependability and the supervision for an example of an 
industrial installation and to have a safe industrial system, a supervision method was implemented. 
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2.  DEPENDABILITY OF COMPLEX AUTOMATED SYSTEMS 
Dependability aims to establish trust between the client and the designer. This is why it is moving 
towards methodologies ensuring efficiency, accuracy and reliability. To achieve these objectives, functional 
analysis is a good way to design, evaluate and manage the dependability of complex automated systems. 
The notion of industrial process covers a wide range of industrial sectors. Indeed, a system is 
defined as a set of interconnected elements, oriented towards achieving an objective. 
Industrial systems are production tools that are subject to economic and technical constraints. They 
must be able to produce quality goods at high speeds required. They are also related to modern and efficient 
production techniques that require a high level of knowledge and skills. In fact, the complexity of industrial 
processes and the variety of conditions for their operations are steadily increasing. This is why these systems 
are often automated. 
Researchers Cauffriez L. and al. [3] have presented a methodology for designing complex 
automated systems. This methodology is divided into six actigrammes (Figure 1). Indeed, actigrammes 1 and 
2 concern the functional architecture, actigrammes 3 and 5 relate to the hardware architecture and 
actigrammes 4 and 6 concern the operational architecture. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. A methodology for the design of intelligent distributed controlled system [3] 
 
 
2.1 Dependability Concepts 
Dependability is understanding, assessing, predicting, measuring and control failures of 
technological systems and human failures [4]. Dependability plays an important role in industrial systems. 
Indeed, it is the science of failure and is characterized by the ability of an entity to satisfy one or more of the 
vital system functions under given conditions. Four interdependent parameters define the RAMS: Reliability, 
Availability, Maintainability and Safety. 
 
2.1.1 Reliability  
According to NF EN 13306, reliability of a system is the ability for it to perform its function under 
given conditions during a given time interval [5]. The term reliability is also used to determine the 
system/equipment concerned, a guaranteed operating time before the occurrence of a failure. Consider the 
time T of occurrence of the failure; this random variable to define the concept of reliability that is interpreted 
as the probability that the entity do not crash after a given time t for given conditions. Reliability is then 
defined as the probability associated R (t) to this notion. It is defined by: 
 
R (t) = probability of a non-defaulting entity on the interval [0, t], assuming it is not in default at time t=0 
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2.1.2 Availability 
Availability, rated A (t) is the ability of a component or system to be up and running at a given time. 
More specifically, availability is the ability to respond to the request in time. The AFNOR X 60-500 defines 
availability as "the ability of an entity to be able to accomplish a required function under given condition at a 
given time or during a given time interval, assuming the providing the support needed maintenance is assured 
"[6]. 
The term availability is then defined as a probability that an entity may determine, based on the 
reliability of the results, the quality of service provided by the system / equipment, under given conditions at 
a given time. The probability associated with A (t) at time t is also referred to availability and is expressed 
by: 
 
A (t) = P (no-defaulting E at time t) 
 
2.1.3 Maintainability  
Maintainability M (t) is the ability of a component or system to be maintained or restored condition. 
Next AFNOR standard is: " under the given conditions of use, the ability of an entity to be maintained or 
restored in a given time interval, in a state in which it can perform a required function when the maintenance 
is performed under given conditions with prescribed procedures and resources "[7]. 
Maintainability of a serviceable entity is characterized by a probability M (t) the maintenance of an 
entity E completed in given conditions, with procedures and prescribed means, is completed at time t , given 
that E fails to time t = 0 [2]. This can be expressed by: M (t) = P (E maintenance was completed at time t). 
 
2.1.4  Safety (Security) 
Security is the ability of a product to meet during all phases of life, an acceptable level of safety 
hazards likely to cause staff assault or a major degradation of the product or its environment. Security is "the 
ability of an entity to avoid appearing in given conditions, critical or catastrophic events» [7]. The role of a 
specialist SdF is to reduce the business risk to its acceptable level by defining: the risk acceptability criteria, 
security design methods and residual risk assessment methods and verification levels accessibility. 
 
2.2 Methodology for Designing Complex Systems 
To study the dependability of complex automated systems, several methods based on static and 
dynamic modeling have been put in place. Indeed, functional analysis is based primarily on the needs 
analysis, functional analysis necessary technical and functional analysis. Features such as a high degree of 
data output trustworthiness, service availability, and protection are the result of a high degree of service 
dependability which is a very important property in the cloud computing environment. Thus it highlights 
some methods, usually based on a graphical representation, in order to facilitate the understanding of 
complex automated systems and the study of their dependability [8]. 
 
2.2.1 Presentation of the SADT Method 
The SADT method is a method of design and analysis of complex systems. It was developed by DT 
Ross in the Softech company in the United States around 1974 [9]. It is a method of descending functional 
analysis that starts from the general to the particular [10]. Indeed, technical system can be described by a 
SADT model represented by a diagram assembly (actigramme and datagram) hierarchically ordered. The 
methodology is rigorous, with specific schema syntax rules that allow a SADT model to communicate 
concisely and precisely important information on the operation and the external interfaces of the system [11]. 
Processors or mechanisms are natural and technological elements that perform the function which is 
characterized primarily by an action on the inputs. The entry consists of the incoming prime matter. It is 
modified by the function and can be considered: product (material), energy or information. The output shows 
the outgoing prime material that is mainly working materials provided with its added value. One can find 
with this outgoing prime material for reports, energy losses and waste. Controls or constraints or steering 
control are the parameters that trigger or modify the realization of a function. They are classified into four 
categories: the configuration parameters; tuning parameters; operating data / operating value; setting energy 
or presence of prime matter. 
 
2.2.2 Presentation of Safe-SADT Method 
Methods for assessing the dependability currently operating are not appropriate, given the level the 
complexity of industrial systems. Inefficient Existing methods have led to the development and propose the 
Safe- SADT method [12], [13], [14]. This method allows the explicit formalization of functional interactions, 
identification of characteristic values that affect the dependability of complex systems, quantification of 
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parameters RAMS (Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety) of the operating system architecture, 
and operational validation of this architecture in terms of dependability objectives and constraints set in the 
functional specification [14]. The main purpose of this method is to evaluate the dependability parameters of 
a global system during the design phase taking into account its evolution in time (Figure 2). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. SAFE-SADT formalism  
 
 
To meet the objectives specified in a specification, the Safe-SADT method defined the operational 
architecture of a system that is obtained from the projection of a functional architecture on a set of resources. 
Given that any function performed by software embedded in the material is defined by a structured series, the 
reliability must be advanced across the system [12]. A Safe-SADT block is to the specification of the 
reliability target for studying the functions and quantification of RAMS parameters of functions.  
The input for the Safe- SADT block contains the different functions that the system can run (speed 
control, temperature control, etc.). The objective defined reliabilities for these services are often indicated in 
the specifications of the functional requirements and RAMS parameter vector association. 
The output for Safe-SADT block shows the evolution of the RAMS parameters of functions 
performed, the results obtained by the projection / desired allocation, as well as the response time and 
controllable and uncontrollable events. The Safe-SADT formalism allows the designer to define, for each 
subsystem at each hierarchical level, some parameters that will be aggregated to determine the value resulting 
from the global setting sub- system functions or modes of operation. The response times and costs are 
convenient to evaluate. The response time of each sub- system depends on the technology and operating 
system [13]. 
At the top of the Safe-SADT block, there are non-controllable events such as random hardware 
failures or software and controllable events such corrective actions, which bring the system to a working 
condition. Constraints and criteria (eg, reliability, characterization systems for performance, subsystems) are 
also considered with the controls on top of a Safe- SADT block. 
At the bottom of the block, the equipment and their dependability characteristics are known from the 
experimental results, laboratory test or manufacturer data. The formalism used to model the redundancy 
execution medium to study the impact of redundancy on RAMS parameters [12].  
The use of Top-Down approach for the decomposition of the system, starting in global level A0 
until the elementary functions of level An. This approach allows the explicit modeling of the characteristics 
of the operational architecture and identification of its dependencies in order to better understand the 
dependability of the overall architecture. Once the lowest level of the Safe- SADT block is reached, it is 
possible to assess the RAMS parameters of the system using the BOTTOM-UP approach. During this stage 
of aggregation, designers can verify that the specifications and constraints imposed by the entire system are 
satisfied. The designer can also at this stage to quantify the response time and estimate the cost of alternatives 
for the operational architecture. 
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3. THE INDUSTRIAL SUPERVISION 
 Supervision consists of commanding a process and supervising its working [15], [16]. To achieve 
this goal, the supervisory system of a process must collect, supervise and record important sources of data 
linked to the process, to detect the possible loss of functions and alert the human operator. In addition, the 
supervision of industrial processes allows the control and the command of automated process in order to 
optimize its operation and to ensure to security. The main parts of a supervised system are [17], [18], [19]: 
• The Man-Machine Interfaces (MMI), displaying information thanks to the information synthesis system. 
• The supervisory tools, supplying services thanks to the automatic supervisory system and the decision 
support systems. 
• The control/command part, interface between the MMI, the supervisory tools and the process. 
• The process is also called production system or operative part, performing the physical work on the input 
product flow. 
These tasks are performed by human operators who make decisions after evaluating the situation of 
the process from the observed variables, using expert knowledge to solve complex situations [20], [21].  
Supervisory control and data acquisition systems (SCADA) are widely used in industry for 
supervisory control and data acquisition of industrial processes. The process can be industrial, infrastructure 
or facility [15-16]. SCADA system is used to observe and supervise the shop floor equipments in various 
industrial automation applications [17-18]. A SCADA system is used to monitor and supervise an overall 
process being implemented by individual automated systems. It typically consists of the following four items 
[22], [23], [24]:  
 A master terminal unit (MTU), which is the central server where information about the overall process is 
collected. This allows a centralized workstation operator to monitor, analyze, and control the entire 
process from a remote location.  
 PLCs and/or RTUs, which control the field equipment doing the process.  
 Communications equipment for transferring data between the PLCs/RTUs and the MTU.  
 Human machine interface (HMI) software, which enables the on-screen operation of the inputs (without 
physically touching them) and displays the status of the outputs. The HMI is installed on all workstations 
(including the MTU), allowing the operators to have easy and intuitive control over the systems.  
 
 
4. PROPOSAL FOR DEPENDABILITY MODEL AND SUPERVISION 
The development of a model helps us to facilitate the analysis, description and understanding of the 
industrial system [25]. Formalism, concepts and representation tools that we will use will help to deepen the 
study system in the design stage. Our goal is the rigorous use of a methodological approach to functional 
analysis and supervision of an industrial facility. This methodology will be adopted to analyze production 
systems to provide a tool for communication between the various users of the system. We quote as an 
example, thermal power generation of electrical energy. 
Figure 3 shows the three essential phases that are central to the development of the model: 
functional analysis of the system; analysis of the operational architecture; supervision of the industrial plan. 
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Figure 3. Model of analysis and supervision of an industrial process 
 
 
In the first phase, we proceed with an analysis and functional modeling of the industrial system 
based on the SADT method. The structure of this method to master the complexity of the process with its 
top-down and modular analysis. 
In the first place, we prepare a SADT model to define the objectives and the view for which the 
model is created. Then we create the A-0 diagram representing the main function for analysis in an 
actigramme. The digraph A0 and A1 development is the third step in this phase.  
This analysis allows us to obtain a functional architecture and hardware architecture of the system. 
An example of modeling of a thermal power plant of electric power is underway. 
Once the functional architecture and hardware architecture have been identified, the next step is to 
determine the operational architecture of an industrial process using the new Safe- SADT formalism. 
The first step of such a functional analysis approach by Safe- SADT method is to identify the system 
and the functions to be performed and the materials used media. Then the second step is to define the 
operational architecture by the projection (allocation) of the functional architecture of the hardware 
architecture. Finally, we proceed with the development of Safe- SADT model. When we are faced with a 
SADT Safe- block complex, we use the same decomposition process of the SADT method. The bottom-up 
approach is then used to aggregate the resulting basic functions of the previous decomposition. 
This second phase of the model provides an operational architecture of the industrial plant studied. 
An example of a water station of a thermal power plant for producing electric energy has been chosen in 
order to validate this second phase. 
After the two phases of analysis of the functional and operational architecture of the system, the 
third phase of the model is to implement a monitoring tool as well as man-machine interfaces for monitoring 
industrial process. Indeed, supervision allows monitoring and control of operation of an installation in order 
to stay within the normal operating range regardless of external disturbances. Using a SCADA system 
(SCADA) for example, all anomalies identified in a water station of a thermal power plant can be detected in 
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real time, from alarms and can identify their causes.Thus supervision is a reference tool for the operator and 
it also allows him to interact directly with a control and supervision system. 
 
 
5. STUDY OF DEPENDABILITY AND SUPERVISION OF REVERSE OSMOSIS STATION 
The Production Centre Rades Electricity is a thermal power plant (TPP) that consists on a system 
producing the electricity while using dry water steam to drag the alternator in rotation (Figure 4). This steam 
is generated in a furnace that transforms the chemical energy of the fuel (natural gas, heavy fuel-oil) in 
calorific energy.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Functionality of a thermal power plant 
 
 
This is one of the most important productions of electric power stations in Tunisia (37% of national 
production). In fact, a TPP is a power plant in which the prime mover is steam driven. Water is heated, turns 
into steam and spins a steam turbine which drives an electrical generator. After it passes through the turbine, 
the steam is condensed in a condenser. The greatest variation in the design of TPPs is due to the different fuel 
sources. Some prefer to use the term energy center because such facilities convert forms of heat energy into 
electrical energy [26]. 
In TPPs, mechanical power is produced by a heat engine which transforms thermal energy, often 
from combustion of a fuel, into rotational energy. Most thermal power plants produce steam, and these are 
sometimes called steam power plants. TIPs are classified by the type of fuel and the type of prime mover 
installed [26]. 
 
5.1 Presentation of the Studied System 
The reverse osmosis (R.O) station operates on the reverse osmosis phenomenon, which consists of 
the spontaneous diffusion of a chemical compound (water) through a semi permeable membrane. It occurs 
when a substance is presented at different concentrations from one side and the other of the membrane. This 
difference causes excess pressure called osmotic pressure. The distribution of this compound is done so that 
the two levels on one side and the other of the membrane tend to equalize. In contrast, reverse osmosis 
enhances concentration of the more concentrated solution by subjecting the less concentrated solution to a 
pressure greater than the osmotic pressure (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5. The reverse osmosis station 
 
 
To offer a general description of the reverse osmosis process, we present knot A-0 SADT model 
(Figure 6). Indeed, among the elements of the reverse osmosis station, we can mention: filter membrane, 
pump. The SADT method is essentially a structured method of representation designed from simple concepts. 
It allows considering the process as a structure composed of simpler systems interact. The hierarchical 
structure diagrams used to represent various levels of detail and in a relatively concise, to the complex simple 
systems. We used the software BpWin for representing diagrams SADT model. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. A-0 level of SADT model of a reverse osmosis station 
 
 
5.2 Validation of the Proposed Model 
To validate the first phase of our general model of analysis and supervision of an industrial process, 
we used the SADT method is a general method that seeks to foster communication between applicants and 
users on the one hand and designers and directors, on the other. After modeling the electricity production 
process TPP the SADT method, using actigrammes of SADT, we established levels A-0, A0 and A1 SADT 
model presented by the three figures 7 and 8. 
 
5.2.1 Application of SADT Method 
The figure below shows a SADT method by thermal power plant. The activity diagram 
(actigramme) developed helped to create or generate a given output (electric energy, losses), to transform, or 
modify or change state an input data (fuel, air, water) and seek the input data from control guidelines, based 
on the potential mechanisms ( boiler, turbine and generator). 
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Figure 7. A-0 level SADT model of a thermal power plant 
 
 
The goal of the obtained model SADT is multiple: the model SADT will allow to take offence at the 
state of the studied system, as shows it both presented levels, and to clear the complexity of the system. 
Indeed, among the complex activities in the TPP, we can quote: the preparation of the water; the 
production of the calorific energy; the production of the mechanical energy; the production of electrical 
energy; recycling steam. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. A0 level of SADT model of a thermal power plant 
 
 
5.2.2 Application of Safe-SADT Method 
In this section, we present the overview of the Safe-SADT model of the system hydraulic part of the 
reverse osmosis station. This system shows that the representation with Safe- SADT method is more reliable 
than the SADT method because it takes the parameters of dependability and the various operating modes 
(figure 10). 
The organization and behavior of functions describe the activities of the automation system 
throughout its life cycle. In our example, we can define the functions of our system as follows: 
“Open valve Vij”, “close valve Vij” and “control pump Pi” 
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“Open valve Vij”, “close valve Vij” and “control pump Pi” 
The first architecture to be defined in the system design is the functional architecture. The functional 
design phase is to decompose the main functions of the system into simpler functions (Table1). These 
functions are also broken down into even simpler sub-functions. 
 
 
Table1. Functional Architecture 
Functional Architecture  
Open valve V11, Close valve V11 
Open valve V21, Close valve V21 
Open valve V12, Close valve V12 
Open valve V22, Close  valve V22 
Control pump P1 
Control pump P2 
 
Table 2. Material Architecture 
Material Architecture 
V11+PLC1 
V21+ PLC 2 
V12+ PLC 1 
V22+ PLC 2 
P1+ PLC 1 
P2+ PLC 2 
 
 
 
Carrying out the functions of the functional architecture requires a choice of equipment (hardware 
and software), which is the hardware architecture. The hardware architecture also specifies for each 
equipment all of its global characteristics (Table 2). The hardware architecture of our system consists of: 
valves, pumps and industrial programmable logic controllers (PLC). 
The operational architecture is the projection of the functional architecture of the hardware 
architecture. This projection leads to assign functions to equipment that uses the cost function to evaluate 
different solutions, and uses assessment tools such as those used to assess a level of dependability or 
performance level. 
 
 
Table 3. Operational Architecture 
Operational Architecture 
Open V11 V11 PLC1 Close V11 
Open  V21 V21 PLC2 Close V21 
Open  V12 V12 PLC 1 Close  V12 
Open  V 22 V22 PLC 2 Close  V22 
Control P2 P2 PLC2 
Control P2 P3 PLC 1 
 
 
Figure 9 shows the development of Safe-SADT model of the hydraulic system. This method 
implemented the steps that detail how the system and its functional architecture, physical and operational. 
The analysis by the Safe-SADT method provides good data carrier on RAMS parameters components in 
order to determine those of the general system. 
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Figure 9. Development of Safe-SADT model of the hydraulic system 
 
 
5.2.3 Supervision of the Raw Water Tank Level 
Supervision plays an important role in the safety of operators and the environment to ensure the 
proper functioning of the system. She considered a tool to ensure the dependability of an industrial process. 
We present in this section a study of a water treatment applied by reverse osmosis and the steps required for 
configuration of the signals. Thus he must follow certain steps in order to monitor the operation of the 
facility. In this section, we present the different configuration on the ICC software (Integrated Control 
Configuration): Software to create and configure programs residing in the CP60 (Process Control). 
An example of supervision of the raw water tank level by a SCADA system of a TPP is presented 
(Figure 10). The unit is powered by two water tanks. Each tank 2300 m3 of water. The water level will be 
displayed on the SCADA system by percentage (%) and has as a unique identifier (12GA1LX001). 
The stations belong to a superior network Ethernet (10 Mb/s). Principally, this network enables to 
exchange files between the stations. It enables to avoid the overload of the Node bus network. In fact, the 
SCADA system is composed by modules that exchange information thanks to the communication network.  
SCADA receives the information displayed on the screen and device status if they move from 
normal to abnormal with the colors. In the SCADA system, there are three levels:  
Data Acquisition; Data Treatment and Men / machine Interface. 
I/A: Intelligent / Automation; FBM: Field bus modules; FCM: Field Bus Communication Module; 
AW: Application work station; WP: Work station Processor; CP60: Control Process60 and DNBT: Dual 
Node Bus. 
FoxDraw is a graphical configurator used to build I/A series process graphics to be displayed via 
FoxView software. It allows creating and maintaining dynamically updating process displays. Displays can 
represent the plant, a process area, or a detailed portion of the process. 
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FoxDraw provides numerous time and effort saving features to make building, configuring, and 
maintaining displays easy. Included with FoxDraw is a large library of graphical components ready to be 
included and configured in displays. FoxDraw includes over 1200 prebuilt objects such as pumps, tanks, 
pipes, motors, valves, and ISA symbols. 
The different stages of this application are the following: 
 Choice of the site of the signal (FBM module). 
 Programming of the AIN block (Analogical Input) for the supervision of the raw water tank level signal. 
  Programming of the CIN block (digital Input) for the supervision of the signal conductivity ball furnace. 
 Test by injection of current for standardization of the AIN block and test of the alarm by short circuit for 
the CIN entrance. 
 Passage of the cable between the room of sampling and the SCADA room. 
 Branching of the analogical signal and the numeric signal. 
 Creation of a new tabular for the general vision of the room of sampling of the TPP. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. The Final alarm display 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
The development of information technology tools and automation systems involves the basic 
concepts of operation and safety supervision. Indeed, functional analysis and structured SADT method was 
used and a new version of this method that takes into account the dependability parameters Safe-SADT has 
been studied. To propose a functional modeling, a general methodological approach and supervision, a 
security analysis model of operation and supervision of an industrial system was developed. Thus we propose 
a validation of the proposed methodology for an example of an industrial installation with a thermal power 
plant of electric power. To have a safe industrial system, a supervision method was implemented. 
We are considering taking into account other aspects in the analysis by the Safe-SADT method such 
as qualitative and quantitative aspects. Thus it is necessary to adopt simulation techniques using the Monte 
Carlo algorithm, for example, to optimize the various solutions adopted by increasing the number of 
functional and physical entities of the system studied. 
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